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ESSAY

APPLAUSE FOR THE PLAUSIBLE

BRANDON L. GARRETT†
INTRODUCTION
Why has the word “plausible” come to define federal civil litigation? In
recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court supplemented longstanding pleading
standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require a
“short and plain statement of the claim,”1 to additionally require that all
civil pleadings state a claim that is “plausible.”2 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, the Court rejected other possible words that might describe the
newly tightened pleading standard, such as “reasonable” or “probable.”3 To
the dismay of many judges, lawyers, and other observers, the Court did not
define “plausible,” except to add that “plausible” pleadings “nudge[] their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”4 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
the Court again did not define “plausible,” except to assert that a “plausible”
claim must not be “conclusory” in nature.5 This Essay explores the complex
and contradictory meanings of the word “plausible.”
Furthermore, this Essay applauds the Supreme Court’s selection of such
an equivocal and conflicted word as the gateway to federal civil litigation.
† Roy L. and Rosamund Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law, University of Virginia School
of Law. Many thanks to Toby Heytens, Alex Reinert, George Rutherglen, and Colin Starger for
their invaluable comments.
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
2 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
557 (2007).
3 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement’ . . . .”).
4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
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As I describe below, “plausible” means “fair” or “reasonable,” but perhaps
only in a superficial sense; what is “plausible” might in fact be “specious” or
used as a “pretext.”6 The word is immune to careful definition. Because of
its ambiguity, it was well selected to expand judicial discretion to dismiss
civil cases. In specific areas of federal civil litigation, the Court has recently
broadened judges’ discretion to dismiss a wide range of civil petitions: civil
rights claims, habeas petitions, class action certification petitions, and more.7
In those contexts, the Court uses words like “reasonable” in ways that bend
their meaning, suggest more objectivity than warranted, and create genuine
confusion between doctrines by using the same word in different ways.
Despite substantial confusion over the choice of the word “plausible” to
govern pleading in federal civil litigation, at least one can say that the word
itself captures the essence of the problem rather than disguising it. Whether
the resulting discretion conferred on district judges is itself warranted or
desirable is a very different question, and a matter of real concern. Because
“plausibility” pleading enhances judicial discretion, the meaning of “plausible”
may increasingly depend on judicial practice and the litigation contexts
where the word is used. Nonetheless, rather than viewing the word selection
as an accident or a misplaced reference, I suggest that the word was deliberately
chosen to be deeply . . . plausible.
I. PLAUSIBLE DEFINITIONS
When Justice Souter, Twombly’s author, saw how Iqbal would expand his
concept of “plausibility” pleading two years later, he was driven to envision
space aliens. He argued in a vigorous dissent that judges should dismiss for
“plausibility” reasons only “sufficiently fantastic” pleadings—like those
involving extraterrestrials, “the plaintiff ’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences
in time travel.”8 Thus, Justice Souter opined that the majority’s interpretation
of “plausible” was a “fundamental misunderstanding.”9
Given the Supreme Court’s own struggle to define “plausible,” it is no
surprise lower courts have adopted a range of interpretations when struggling
with the new “plausibility” standard.10 Scholars have similarly thrown up

6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part III.
8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 695.
10 See generally Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between

the Possible and the Probable: Defining the
Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 505, 520-26 (2009) (highlighting the Third and Tenth Circuits’ opaque tests, as well as the
Second and Seventh Circuits’ “sliding-scale” approach).
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their hands.11 Professor Alex Reinert rightly describes the confusion created
as partly “linguistic,”12 while Professor Arthur Miller notes that “inconsistent
rulings on virtually identical complaints may well be based on individual
judges having quite different subjective views of what allegations are
plausible.”13 Similarly, Professor Tung Yin calls the Court’s definition itself
“peculiar, if not implausible,”14 and Professor Patricia Hatamyar comments
that “[a]t this point, the law of pleading consists of pronouncements worthy
of Lao-tzu.”15
“Plausibility” does not require heightened pleading, except that it does.
Judges are not to weigh evidence, except that they must: after all, “plausible”
was previously used by the Court in the summary judgment context.16
Deciding what is a “mere conclusion”17 and what is a factual assertion to be
weighed raises difficult questions; after all, “one person’s ‘conclusion’ is
another person’s ‘fact.’”18 Furthermore, many allegations raise mixed
questions of law and fact.
Although few scholars or judges have discussed the definition of “plausible,”
scholars have generally disapproved of the word choice. Professor Louis
Kaplow, one of the few to dwell on the definition, notes: “As a matter of
clarity in communication, it is unfortunate that the Court chose as its key
term one having as a standard definition the very notion it meant to
reject.”19 When in doubt, judges may turn to dictionary definitions of
11 For a sampling of the voluminous critical literature, see, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 831 (2010) (“[T]he Court’s
route to Iqbal’s result, built on Twombly’s trail, will mess up the civil litigation system.”); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 459 (2008) (“[T]he Court's
plausibility standard may require different levels of factual detail depending upon the substantive
context.”). See also infra notes 12-15, 19 and accompanying text.
12 Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-2 (2012).
13 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 30 (2010).
14 Tung Yin, “I Do Not Think [Implausible] Means What You Think It Means”: Iqbal v. Ashcroft
and Judicial Vouching for Government Officials, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 203, 204 (2010).
15 Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 553, 583 (2010). See generally id. 583, n.197 (sampling the perplexing and selfcontradictory aphorisms found in the TAO TE CHING, a classic Chinese text).
16 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1986)
(“[T]he absence of any plausible motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to
whether a ‘genuine issue for trial’ exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e).” (emphasis added)).
17 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009) (“A court considering a motion to dismiss
may begin by identifying allegations that, because they are mere conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth.”).
18 Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 566.
19 Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1256 n.187 (2013); see also
Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of Milton Handler, and
the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG. 1, 14 (2008) (“[T]he use of the
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words; however, as some judges recognize, dictionary definitions may not
be helpful when more than one definition is “plausible.”20 Some judges have
tried unsuccessfully to fix meaning to the word “plausible” using dictionary
definitions. For example, one dissenting judge in an Eleventh Circuit
opinion noted: “Synonyms for ‘plausible’ include ‘credible,’ ‘creditable,’
‘likely,’ ‘believable,’ ‘presumptive’ and ‘probable.’”21 In another case, when a
doctor was asked to testify about medical “plausibility,” the doctor
answered: “Plausible ... is a very vague term. It’s a hypothetical possibility.”22
Confusion notwithstanding, “plausible” has a range of definitions that
shed light on the task for which the word has been so recently elevated by
the Supreme Court. Take for example, these three definitions from the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary: “plausible” means (1) “superficially fair,
reasonable, or valuable but often specious <a plausible pretext>,” (2) “superficially pleasing or persuasive <a swindler…, then a quack, then a smooth,
plausible gentleman — R. W. Emerson>,” or (3) “appearing worthy of belief
<the argument was both powerful and plausible>.”23 Indeed, in the Twombly
opinion, later reversed by the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit noted
that, in another context, the Ninth Circuit had employed a definition of
“plausible” from an early edition of Webster’s Dictionary: “superficially
worthy of belief: CREDIBLE.”24
Other dictionary definitions convey similarly contradictory meanings.
None suggests a fixed or objective measure of truth or accuracy. If anything,
dictionary definitions of “plausible” imply a lack of objective measures. The
MacMillan Dictionary defines “plausible” as “likely to be true” or “able to
be considered seriously for a particular job or purpose.”25 The Oxford

term plausible to describe the heightened pleading standard seems like an odd choice.” (emphasis
in original)). But see Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 209 (2010)
(explaining that the Court’s use of “plausible” comports with the word’s dictionary definition).
20 See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 651 n.6 (2004) (“[E]ither definition of
‘accident’ is at first glance plausible . . . .”).
21 Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010) (Ryskamp, J., dissenting).
22 Althen v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 58 Fed. Cl. 270, 283 (Fed. Cl.
2003) (ellipsis in original).
23 Plausible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plausible
(last visited Apr. 8, 2014) (emphasis and ellipsis in original).
24 Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
(quoting Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 664 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1736 (Philip Babcock Gove & The MerriamWebster Editorial Staff eds., 1976 ed.))).
25 Plausible, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/
american/plausible (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
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Dictionary defines “plausible” as “seeming reasonable or probable.”26 These
dictionaries also include definitions suggesting that “plausible” connotes the
opposite of the truth. The Oxford Dictionary, for example, adds that, when
used as an adjective for a person, “plausible” can mean “skilled at producing
persuasive arguments, especially ones intended to deceive: a plausible liar.”27
The word’s superficial and possibly negative connection to accuracy is built
into its meaning.
Black’s Law Dictionary has no definition of “plausible,” because it is not a
word that has gained accepted legal usage—unlike “reasonable,” “probable,”
and some others. Common legal parlance implies that a “plausible” argument is not yet fully formed. At the pleading stage, facts are alleged and not
yet proven, and requiring only “plausible” allegations may be appropriate;
however, that again depends (1) on whether a “plausibility” standard
requires some degree of accuracy attached to the allegations, and (2) if it
does, on the degree of accuracy required. Without defining the word, Black’s
Law Dictionary suggests a definition elsewhere, in its definition of “colorable,” a
synonym for “plausible” in legal parlance: “That which is in appearance
only, and not in reality, what it purports to be, hence counterfeit, feigned,
having the appearance of truth.”28 However, a plaintiff would not want to
embrace this definition’s connotation that what is “plausible” on the exterior
disguises a claim “not in reality.”
In contrast to the current “plausibility” pleading standard, the prior noticepleading standard did not purport to address factual support for claims at
all, and thus avoided the difficulty of determining when facts were sufficiently
“plausible.”29 Having decided to test factual allegations, perhaps the word
“plausible”—with its equivocal meanings—accurately conveys the most
realistic expectations for judges ruling at the pleading stage, when allegations
are assumed to be true. Further, the word’s evasive meaning explains why
so few courts have relied on dictionary definitions—and perhaps why the
Court declined to provide a definition for “plausible” in Twombly and Iqbal.

26 Plausible, OXFORD DICTIONARY , http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_
english/plausible (last visited Apr. 8, 2014). Regardless, the Court was clear it was not adopting a
“probability” measure when it selected the “plausibility” standard. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
27 Plausible, supra note 26 (emphasis in original).
28 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 265 (6th ed. 1990).
29 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (explaining that the
“simplified notice pleading standard” under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “relies on liberal
discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose
of unmeritorious claims”)
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II. PLAUSIBLE PEOPLE
The choice of the word “plausible” brings with it cultural associations,
including longstanding use in literature to refer to people who are superficial.
This Part describes a few well-known literary examples in which the authors
used “plausible” to describe unsavory people who use false appearances to
take advantage of others. They show how, despite our efforts to assess
people’s truthfulness, our lie-detecting skills are limited—as is our information
about the people being judged. The anxiety generated by these literary
characters mirrors that faced by judges, who must now—with only preliminary
representations by the parties—assess the plausibility of allegations made
in litigation.
The full Emerson quotation excerpted in the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary30 is wonderful and apt:
So each man, like each plant, has his parasites. A strong, astringent, bilious
nature has more truculent enemies than the slugs and moths that fret my
leaves. Such an [sic] one has curcilios, borers, knife-worms: a swindler ate
him first, then a client, then a quack, then smooth, plausible gentlemen,
bitter and selfish as Moloch.31

This strong, astringent person, beset by clients but also by the “quack” and
the “plausible gentlemen,” sounds like a lawyer with an active civil practice.
Charles Dickens, in a more caustic and lengthier parody, discusses the
“plausible gentleman” and the “plausible lady” as “a plausible couple.”32
Such a couple are “people of the world,” and “while the plausible couple
depreciate, they are still careful to preserve their character for amiability
and kind feeling; indeed the depreciation itself is often made to grow out of
their excessive sympathy and good will.”33
William Shakespeare uses an archaic form, “plausive,”34 to refer to a
display of public manners by a person who may not be what he seems, and
also to refer to powerful and deeply felt expressions. Hamlet describes the

30
31
32

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
RALPH WALDO EMERSON, ESSAYS AND POEMS 387 (Barnes & Noble Classics 2004).
CHARLES DICKENS, The Plausible Couple, in SKETCHES OF YOUNG LADIES, YOUNG
GENTLEMEN, AND YOUNG COUPLES 54, 56-57 (London, Chapman & Hall 1843), available at
http://www.dickens-online.info/sketches-of-young-couples-page19.html.
33 Id. at 55, 60.
34 See Plausive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster. com/dictionary/
plausive (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) (defining “plausive” to mean both “pleasing” (in obsolete uses
of the word) and “specious” (in archaic uses)).
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“form of plausive manners” that appear to mark some men with a “defect.”35
In contrast, the King in All’s Well That Ends Well describes his old friend’s
“plausive words,” that not only rang true, but also were “scatter’d not in
ears, but grafted [there], [t]o grow.”36
The word’s origins trace back to the Latin plausibilis, which means “worthy
of applause.”37 Perhaps that Latin root gets it best. We may applaud
something that is superficially pleasing when it is a show, a spectacle, or in
literature. However, we do not applaud something that is the work of a
“quack” or a “smooth, plausible gentleman” whose doings are not for our
entertainment, but rather, at our expense. Similarly, when we listen to a
courtier’s mannered words, an old friend’s sympathetic advice, or a swindler’s
enticing promises, we may cautiously judge the worth of these statements.
In contrast, the legal system demands of a judge more than a decision
about whether to applaud. We hold lawyers to professional and ethical
standards when they plead a legal claim or defense on behalf of a client.
Moreover, discovery, summary judgment procedures, and applicable rules
of evidence at a trial will ideally uncover more reliable information about
the merits of a claim. Yet, assessing “plausibility” at the initial pleading
stage, before discovery, may force judges to size up a person’s “plausibility”—
or rather, “applaudability”—as they would in a social or business setting.
III. LESS APPLAUSE-WORTHY ALTERNATIVES: “REASONABLE,”
“STRONG,” AND “CONVINCING”
If the Supreme Court needed to define a heightened standard for civil
pleading, then choosing “plausible” as the standard is preferable to other
word choices, which might have caused far more concern. To start, consider
the myriad uses for the workhorse term “reasonable.” For example, the
Court’s qualified immunity decisions lifted the word “reasonable” from
familiar uses in the Fourth Amendment context, and began applying it to
all § 1983 constitutional-tort suits against executive officers.38 The Court
35 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, THE PRINCE OF DENMARK
act 1, sc. 4, ll. 30-31 (J.J.M. Tobin ed., Wadsworth, Cengage Learning 2012).
36 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ALL’S WELL THAT ENDS WELL act 1, sc. 2, ll. 53-55 (Sir
Arthur Quiller-Couch & John Dover Wilson eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1965).
37 Latin Definition for: Plausibilis, Plausibilis, Plausibile, LATDICT, http://www.latindictionary.net/definition/30685/plausibilis-plausibilis-plausibile (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
38 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 801 (1982)). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color
of any statute . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured . . . .”).
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recognized an affirmative defense for officials who violate a plaintiff ’s
constitutional rights, if the officials can show that they acted in a way that
was objectively “reasonable” to an official in light of “clearly established”
law in place at the time.39 That usage gives judges authority to dismiss civil
rights cases early on in litigation, based on their judgment that any constitutional violation might have nevertheless been tolerable.
In habeas corpus litigation, the word “reasonable” may do double, triple,
or even quadruple duty when analyzing a prisoner’s constitutional claim—
and for each separate usage, the word is used in a very different sense.
First, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) imposes a requirement on state habeas petitioners to show that a
state court adjudicated their claims “contrary to . . . clearly established
Federal law,” or at least in a manner that “involved an unreasonable application
of clearly established Federal law.”40 The Supreme Court noted in Williams
v. Taylor that “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define,” but
the Court nevertheless maintained that a decision must be more than
“incorrect,” it “must also be unreasonable.”41 Second, an underlying constitutional habeas claim may prompt analysis of whether prior counsel’s
representation fell below “an objective standard of reasonableness,” and
whether that inadequate representation had a “reasonable probability” of
affecting the outcome.42 Third, separate harmless-error tests ask whether
there is a “reasonable” probability that the error was prejudicial.43 Finally,
the Court’s innocence “gateway to defaulted claims” asks whether, based on
new evidence of innocence, a “reasonable juror” would find guilt “beyond a
39
40
41

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
529 U.S. 362, 410-11 (2000). More recently, the Supreme Court has sown deep—and,
hopefully, unintended and remediable—confusion by implicitly endorsing a formulation that
Williams rejected as misleading and subjective. In Harrington v. Richter, the Court mentioned in
dicta that the AEDPA unreasonableness standard asks whether “there is no possibility fair-minded
jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.” 131 S.
Ct. 770, 786 (2011). But see Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10 (refusing to define “‘an unreasonable
application’ by reference to a ‘reasonable jurist’”). For criticism of the Richter decision, see, as an
example, Amy Knight Burns, Note, Counterfactual Contractions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis of
AEDPA, 65 STAN. L. REV. 203, 220-21 (2013), which notes “inconsistency and incoherence
lurking in the Richter opinion.”
42 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
43 See generally, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (establishing a federal
habeas harmless-error standard that bars habeas relief when a constitutional error had no
“substantial and injurious effect,” or when no “actual prejudice” resulted). Furthermore, as noted
above, the Court defines “prejudice” for ineffective assistance of counsel claims as that which
creates a “reasonable probability” that an error affected the habeas petitioner’s outcome in the
original case. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); see also supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
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reasonable doubt.”44 Overall, habeas corpus review is replete with the very
different roles and meanings assigned to the word “reasonable.” Justice
Scalia has commented that such doctrines create “ineffable gradations of
probability . . . beyond the ability of the judicial mind (or any mind) to grasp.”45
Sometimes a standard explicitly calls for a higher probability—but still
may not define it precisely. For example, in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., the Supreme Court explained that for pleadings under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, “[t]o qualify as ‘strong[,]’ . . . an
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it
must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of
nonfraudulent intent.”46 Yet, the Court notes that “Congress left the key
term ‘strong inference’ undefined.”47 Similarly, the Court’s recent intervention
into class action litigation in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes described the
need for “convincing proof” to support class certification.48 However, since
“convincing,” like “plausible” in Twombly and Iqbal, was not precisely
defined, “[t]he majority’s language in Wal-Mart has the potential to work
the same mischief.”49
Perhaps standards about certainty are clearer when they refer to an
accepted standard of proof, like “a preponderance of the evidence” or
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” In those contexts, there is judicial experience
in considering the relevant standards, and deference to decisions of factfinders when applying them in the first instance. In contrast, efforts to erect
new threshold standards (e.g., based on the terms “reasonable,” “strong,” or
“convincing”) raise special challenges. The word “plausible” may be vague
and susceptible to contradictory meanings, but at least it does not risk
creating a false veneer of judicial objectivity or certainty.
CONCLUSION
The new “plausibility” standard places great discretion in the hands of
judges, who, as the Supreme Court explained in Iqbal, must draw on
“experience and common sense.”50 One scholar bemoans the word “plausible”

44
45
46
47
48
49
50

House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006).
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 86 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
Id.
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011).
Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 35 (2011).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Defining judicial experience and its relevance
to “plausibility” assessments provides yet another challenge. See generally Henry S. Noyes, The
Rise of the Common Law of Federal Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly, and the Application of Judicial
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as simply “too general a word to be the basis of a judge-made revolution
involving pleading and open access to courts.”51 Thus, Professor Kaplow
labels the “plausibility” standard “unclear, question-begging in key respects,
and at bottom open-ended.”52 These concerns all invite a normative assessment:
if no words can clearly express a judge’s task, perhaps that task should not
be performed at all.
Exploring the contradictory meanings of “plausibility” does not resolve
its definitional paradoxes, but does help to clarify them. The Court chose a
word that candidly admits its competing meanings. In contrast, the much
used and abused “reasonable” may suggest a misleading sense of precision.
Had the Court gone down the same road to raise the bar for pleading
standards, but selected “reasonable” or “probable” or other such terms, the
consequences might have been far more problematic.
A swindler may appear trustworthy, while an innocent may falsely confess.
Facts alleged in a pleading may be accurate or superficial. Similarly, a
judge’s decision about whether to accept a pleading may or may not appear
“plausible.” As a result, the chief virtue of the new “plausibility” standard is
the transparency of its vice.

Preferred Citation: Brandon L. Garrett, Applause for the Plausible, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 221 (2014), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/
162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-221.pdf.

Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 857, 871-78 (2012) (critiquing the Court’s reliance on “judicial
experience” by highlighting its failure to explain the term).
51 Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 9 (2010).
52 Kaplow, supra note 19, at 1297.

